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Marxist and Muslim lifeworlds nowadays do not converge a lot. They are generally 
thought so much apart, both in theory and practice, that any mention of ‘Muslim 
Marxism’ appears hopelessly oxymoronic. Marx’s denunciation of religion as ‘the opium 
of the people’1 and countless accounts of religious persecution under the communist 
rule are often invoked as a grim reminder of the supposed incompatibility of Marxist 
and Muslim ideas. Yet, historically, such incompatibility is tenuous. Not only did many 
Muslim thinkers tend towards Marxism (a tendency so neatly captured by the French 
adjective marxisant)2 and vice versa, in ways more than one;3 there also emerged, 
especially in the Worlds designated as Third,4 idiosyncratic forms of individual and 
collective praxis whose transformative potential was owed precisely to the idea that 
rudimentary Marxist views on social and economic justice can and must be reconciled 
with those of Muslim political and social consciousness. 
Nowhere can this bold idea—the idea of Muslim Marxism—be better traced than 
to the eventful life and legacy of the controversial Tatar Muslim and  olshevik political 
and social reformer Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev  in Tatar  Mirsa yet Soltang a liev;  89 –
1940). Caught between the demise of one long-standing empire and a rapid rise of 
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another, that is, between the unmaking of czarist Russia and the making of the Soviet 
Union, Sultan-Galiev’s story is that of a personal and ideological struggle in an 
inauspicious time; a story of an avant-garde take on Muslim subjectivity, tradition and 
revolutionary potential, albeit with a tragic ending.  
Sultan-Galiev’s good repute amongst the Muslims and communists alike of the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia of the early twentieth century, earned in 
an unusually rapid fashion, made him a chief authority on the so-called ‘Eastern 
Question’, which in the Soviet context mainly related to its vast eastern territories, 
populated, amongst others, by millions of Muslims, largely of Turkic origins. It is this 
anxiety of the emerging Soviet state about its Eurasian Muslim populace—famously 
exemplified in Lenin’s observation that one has to be a thousand times more careful and 
accommodating than usual when dealing with these ‘national minorities’5—that 
provided Sultan-Galiev and other like-minded Muslim activists with an opportunity to 
negotiate a rather unique, even if short-lived, position for Soviet Muslims, of not only 
relative freedom to worship and association in an age of militant atheism but also of 
increasing participation in the state’s political and military affairs. Sultan-Galiev’s 
ambitions were, however, much greater, and had he managed to retain the trust of 
Stalin and his inner circle towards the close of the interbellum period, he may have 
wrestled an even greater autonomy for Soviet Muslims. Indeed, he may even (as he 
would later be accused of planning) have spearheaded a revolutionary insurgency of his 
own, which, in all likelihood, would have been Muslim and Third World socialist in 
nature.  
The intent of this article is to provide a preliminary critical reassessment of the 
rise and fall of Muslim Marxism of Sultan-Galiev’s type. Sultan-Galiev’s own works, 
spanning a variety of genres from poetry and prose in Muslim social and educational 
magazines to relentlessly Bolshevik political writing in state-sanctioned journals such 
as Zhizn’ natsional’nostei (The Life of Nationalities), offer a rich source of analysis in 
their own right, and are particularly useful when compared with archival data on his 
party work, trials and prison notes, including an autobiographical letter.6 Most of these 
sources are still available in Russian and Tatar only. This is, however, not to say that 
some of Sultan-Galiev’s works have not been of interest to a much wider scholarly and 
activist community;7 my argument is, rather, that specifically Muslim dimensions of his 
social and political mission were more often than not sidelined in contemporary 
accounts of his life and work, or were given unduly literalist explanations.8  
I would like to propose that such readings of Sultan-Galiev’s thought and actions 
fail to take into account his extraordinarily difficult political position, as a chief 
mediator between, on the one hand, an increasingly autocratic Soviet socialist elite, 
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bearing all hallmarks of Said’s Orientalism and Great-Russian chauvinism, and the 
reform-minded Muslim Eurasians, on the other. This is particularly true with regards to 
his interpretation of Muslim subjectivity, which uses but ultimately transgresses the 
early twentieth-century concepts of ethnic, national and religious belonging in order to 
re-imagine and give primacy to Muslim political—and, indeed, revolutionary—umma 
(community). It is equally evident in his formative years, which involved Muslim 
religious schooling of the so-called jadīdist type, thus inextricably linking his 
educational experience with the work of an earlier Muslim reformer, Ismail Gasprinski  
 in Turkish  İsmail Gasp ral ,  85 -1914), a Crimean Tatar deeply invested in a Muslim 
modernist educational, linguistic and cultural project that had transformed beyond 
recognition the educational landscape of the late tsarist Russia.9 I argue that the uṣūl al-
jadīd, or ‘new method’, that Gasprinski  had introduced to Muslim schools and 
popularised, as a form of critical thinking, amongst Muslim intelligentsia in the 
turbulent fin-de-siècle period immediately preceding the fall of the Russian Empire, had 
given Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev an invaluable model for his future work.   key element of 
this model, befitting the trying times and circumstances of both Gasprinski  ’s and 
Sultan-Galiev’s lifeworlds, is that of satr, or ‘concealment’ for the greater good, which 
the two reformers have exercised and perfected in their own idiosyncratic ways, thus 
escaping censorship and other, ostensibly more serious, forms of repression. In 
Gasprinski  ’s case, it enabled the gradual introduction of over 5,000 uṣūl al-jadīd schools 
in Russia by 1916 and the creation of an important intellectual movement that in many 
ways had assisted the survival of Muslim social and political life in the times to come. In 
Sultan-Galiev’s case, it evolved into a full-fledged revolutionary methodology of rare 
sophistication; so rare, in fact, that it continues to befuddle the connoisseurs of his work 
until this very day. I will propose here, albeit with some caution, that the strategic 
deployment of satr by Gasprinski  and Sultan-Galiev, which only a careful deduction can 
reveal, as it is never explicitly stated, is reminiscent of the satr that used to be a staple of 
Ottoman social relations, as averred, for example, around the year 1601, by the Ottoman 
jurist ‘Ālī al-Qārī’ al-Harawī.10 In a sense, then, Gasprinski  ’s and Sultan-Galiev’s uses of 
concealment for the ‘greater good’ represent a revival of an important principle from a 
milieu not entirely strange to either of the two reformers.  
What follows, then, is an attempt to re-contextualise Sultan-Galiev’s oeuvre with 
a particular focus on its Muslim-specific elements. I will first introduce his take on 
Muslim subjectivity and praxis, which I understand to be an amalgamation of his 
personal experience of class-based injustice, his jadīdist views and his deep-felt 
revolutionary cause directed at liberating Muslims from colonial oppression, firstly in 
respect to his own (Tatar and Bashkir) populace struggling under Russian imperialism, 
and then Muslims in the Third World(s) writ large, with Euro-American capitalist 
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imperialism and native metropolitan bourgeoisie identified as their arch-enemies. I will 
then address Sultan-Galiev’s political interventions aimed specifically at building a 
Muslim socialist movement. After initial success, this would become a vexed matter, 
involving, shortly before its downfall in the hands of the Stalinist state, a series of 
clandestine interactions that ultimately cost Sultan-Galiev his life as well as the lives of 
much of his family and his real or imagined political inner circle. Finally, I will briefly 
reflect on some of the afterlives of Muslim Marxism in places geographically far away 
but close in terms of religious and political belonging to Sultan-Galiev’s homeland, and 
their enduring, if uncanny, relevance for the contemporary reformulations of Muslim 
religious, political and social selfhood. 
Sultan-Galiev’s early life and directions 
Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev was born in 1892 in the Bashkir village of Elembet’evo in the Ufa 
governorate, which was then part of the Russian Empire. His father, a respected 
schoolteacher, followed Gasprinski  ’s ‘new method’11 in teaching his Muslim pupils, 
including the young Mir-Said.  part from what was called ‘Islamic history and methods 
of thought’, the curriculum included a variety of social and natural sciences as well as 
languages other than Russian, such as Tatar and Arabic.12 Mir-Said’s particular passion 
was Russian literature, which he was able to read in its original language from an early 
age, as well as Muslim folk stories and customs. The jadīdist schooling taught him 
critical thinking, however, and some of his earliest contributions to the Muslim press 
were directed against customary practices that he thought repugnant to modern 
Muslim culture, such as the ḥudūd punishments for the offence of zina.13 His further 
education, directed towards his becoming a teacher himself, as well as his literary and 
journalist work, quickly gained support from Tatar jadīdist intelligentsia. Yet, his own 
class experience gave him an opportunity to reflect upon an element that was still 
clearly missing from Muslim Tatar life—that of social equality and economic justice.  
Sultan-Galiev was born into a ‘mixed’ family of a father who proudly called 
himself a Mishar  Mişär), a member of a Tatar peasant community,14 and a mother who 
came from a Tatar noble family. In an autobiographical letter, Sultan-Galiev reflected 
upon the continuous bullying he was subjected to by his mother’s cousins at her father’s 
estate as formative of his early class-consciousness. ‘Thus’, he wrote in  9 3, ‘the 
farmstead of my grandfather was for me the first and most realistic revolutionary 
school, cultivating in me a feeling of class hatred’.15 It is, one can assume, this feeling of 
his—and the lack thereof in his Tatar intellectual circles—that pushed Sultan-Galiev to 
Marxist literature, which he read very sparsely. Surprisingly, perhaps, this literature did 
not impress him very much. What he was after was a social and political movement able 
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to tackle class difference in everyday life and, in his jadīdist mind, one that could 
simultaneously respond to colonial injustices felt by Muslims everywhere. In his own 
words, written in 1917, Sultan-Galiev attested that he had discovered such a movement 
in the form of the  olsheviks, because ‘they had done more for the Muslims than anyone 
else’   
Only they are striving to transfer the nationalities’ fates into their own hands. 
Only they revealed who started the world war. What doesn’t lead me to them? 
They also declared war on English imperialism, which oppresses India, Egypt, 
Afghanistan, Persia and Arabia. They are also the ones who raised arms against 
French imperialism, which enslaves Morocco, Algeria and other Arab states of 
Africa. How could I not go to them? You see, they uttered the words that have 
never been uttered before in the history of the Russian state. Appealing to all 
Muslims of Russia and the East, they announced that Istanbul must be in 
Muslims’ hands.16  
This confession reveals some of the elementary tenets of Sultan-Galiev’s revolutionary 
project. His first concern, even when it was not explicitly stated, seemed always to be 
for Muslims, whose subjectivity he loosely construed as one marked by continuous class 
and colonial oppression. They were, for him, the most perfect example of Third World 
proletariat, whose history and social cohesion had made them uniquely placed to ignite 
and lead world revolution.  lthough he frequently used concepts such as ‘nationality’ 
and showed special interest in the liberation of Turkic nations from tsarist colonialism 
and then from post-revolutionary Russian hegemony, in all likelihood he saw pan-
Turkism, of which he was often accused, as but one of the potential avenues towards 
global Muslim socialist uprising. 
Race, class and the Colonial International  
Another struggle, directly associated with Sultan-Galiev’s project of world revolution, 
which was often hinted at but, yet again, somewhat obliquely formulated in his writing, 
was the struggle for racial equality. He wrote of colonialists ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, as it 
were, as white racists, who exploited non-white populations of the East, in which he 
occasionally included the native populations of the Americas, simply on the basis of 
perceived racial difference.17 It is plain that he had excluded Turkic and Caucasian 
Muslims from his definition of ‘colonial whiteness’. In his vision of the Colonial 
International, which was to cooperate with or even replace the Third International 
(1919-1943),18 racial and class difference were to be concomitantly tackled. In an 
almost prophetic gesture,19 Sultan-Galiev denounced Eurocentric models of class 
struggle as a contradictio in terminis when applied in the East: 
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We think that the plan to replace one class of European society by the world 
dictatorship of its adversary—that is, by another class from this same society—
will bring no significant change in the situation of the oppressed part of 
humanity. Even if there would be a change, it would be for the worse, not for 
the better.20 
Class differences in the East were, for Sultan-Galiev, inextricably linked to European 
colonialism and the urban-rural divide it had exacerbated, ‘the parasitism and 
reactionary foundations of the material culture of the metropolis [being] a chief factor 
of today’s global [capitalist] development’.21 In this context, anti-colonial, racial and 
class struggle could not be artificially separated from one another.  
It is interesting that further social revolution, which for the majority of his 
Bolshevik comrades undoubtedly meant the demise of all religions, including Islam, was 
not for Sultan-Galiev something worth pursuing prior to world revolution.22 On closer 
inspection, one realises that for him this may not have been something worth pursuing 
at all.23 Yet, as the highest-ranking Muslim of the Soviet communist state,24 which 
advocated fervent ‘atheisation’ of its citizens, Sultan-Galiev could not but accept, if only 
in principle, this tenet of Bolshevik modernity.  
 But to understand the very possibility of merging Bolshevik and Muslim 
modernities in a single revolutionary praxis, one needs to take a step back and consider 
the larger context in which such interventions were taking place.  
On jadīds ‘on the left’ and Bolsheviks turning ‘eastwards’  
The strand of jadīdism into which Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev was  quite literally) born was 
distinct from that of Gasprinski  ’s in the Crimea and still different from the jadīd thought 
in Central Asia. As one of the foremost scholars of this intellectual tradition has averred, 
jadīdism ‘was a coherent movement to the extent that it was  or came to be) embedded 
in a set of self-reproducing institutions (e.g. new-method schools that recruited their 
own graduates to teach in them). Beyond that, it is difficult to impute any unity to the 
“movement”’. 25  Even the way the jadīds commonly called themselves—ziyālilar 
(intellectuals) and taraqqiparwarlar (progressives)26—attests to a pluralist community 
of reformers loosely united  but) by a set of common principles. These included their 
dedication to new methods of production and transmission of knowledge, especially by 
means of print, translation and pedagogy. Gasprinski  ’s attempts to achieve greater 
unity amongst the jadīds through a common literary language did not go down well 
(especially not amongst the Volga Tatars), neither did the later efforts at creating a 
number of distinct ‘nationalities’ out of an irreverently fluid sense of self that seems to 
have prevailed amongst the late tsarist and early Soviet Muslims. In fact, in many jadīd 
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writings in a variety of Turkic and other languages and dialects, ‘the distinction between 
Islam as a faith and Muslims as a community disappears completely’.27 Moreover, such 
Muslim pluralist ‘communalism’ was not uncommon in many other Third World 
contexts and was often considered a hallmark of Muslim modernity.28  
 While jadīdism was coterminous with the rising awareness amongst Muslims of 
an increasing political and social importance of the concepts such as ‘nation’  millat, 
millet) or ‘homeland’  watan, vatan),29 many jadīds, along with some other Muslim 
intellectuals, refused to take such concepts for granted. Instead, they sought to measure 
them against the perceived borderlines of their imagined community  religious, ‘ethnic’, 
linguistic or otherwise) and point to such concepts’ numerous shortcomings. Conflating 
the old Ottoman concept of millet30 with the term ‘nation’ was seen as particularly 
dangerous, since it could have undermined the greater unity (in diversity) and 
communality of Muslims.31  
Besides, jadīdism rose and was in many ways a response to the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century disintegration of Muslim imperial subjecthood in both 
Russian and Ottoman empires. The new nation-based concepts of Empire explored both 
in the early Soviet and Turkish states were met with a mixed response, with some 
Muslim intelligentsia lamenting the loss of the caliphate32 while others saw an 
opportunity for a reformulation of Muslim identity tout court. The precursors of such 
debates, including Ismail Gasprinski  , while toying with the ideas such as pan-Turkism, 
always kept in mind the ‘big picture’, i.e. the Muslim umma as a whole, which needed to 
be revived from its perceived rigor mortis.33 Many members of the later generations of 
jadīds, especially some notable contemporaries of Sultan-Galiev, saw the Russian 
Revolution of 191734 as an opportunity to do just that, and ‘joined it as soon as it was 
possible’.35 No doubt the idea of a Muslim socialist revolution, which the jadīds sought 
to ignite, differed to that of the Bolsheviks. But, importantly, the two factions shared a 
vested interest in ‘revolutionising the East’. For the  olsheviks, the Third World was 
increasingly becoming a substitute for their (failed) efforts to revolutionise Europe, 
while the jadids increasingly saw the Russian Revolution as an opportunity to ‘help 
liberate Muslims of India and the Middle East from the tyranny of the  ritish’36 and the 
French. It is in this context that the ideas about anti-colonialism and communism, which 
the jadids sought to link with their Muslim and Turkic ‘communalism’, began to 
converge, thus preparing a ground for further cross-fertilisation.   
At first, the jadids and other Muslim intellectuals ‘on the left’ sought to preserve 
the plurality of their approaches to socialism. Thus, for example, a Muslim Socialist 
Committee (Müsülman Sosialist Komitesi), which formed in 1917 in Kazan and which 
Sultan-Galiev soon joined, espoused a great internal diversity of views.37 What brought 
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them together was the idea of a common revolutionary agency that was Muslim, Third 
World and socialist/communist in nature. ‘In order to prevent the oppression of the 
toiler of the East’, averred Sultan-Galiev in  9 8, ‘we must unite the Muslim masses in a 
communist movement that will be our own and autonomous’.38 A few years later, 
however, even he began to understand that such a project would require a great deal of 
manoeuvring within an increasingly hostile Soviet state.  
 While the Bolsheviks continued to provide concessions for Muslims, including a 
short-lived return of sharī‘a courts and administrative councils,39 and made every effort 
to forge lasting ties with ‘the peoples of the East’,40 the 1920s brought a sway of state 
policies aimed at an ever-increasing central control41 that saw Muslim intellectuals, 
including Sultan-Galiev, wary as to the future of their revolutionary project. With such 
concerns in mind, Sultan-Galiev and some other Tatar functionaries proposed, in 
October  9  , that the unfair division of Soviet peoples into ‘step-sons and true sons’42 
be corrected by allowing the existing autonomous republics and oblasts ‘to enter the 
Soviet Union directly, that is, to be removed from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic]’—a proposal Stalin angrily rejected.43 By then, however, Sultan-
Galiev’s activism moved mostly underground—as if in anticipation of his imminent fall 
from grace with the Soviet state.44 
Sultan-Galiev and other Muslim intellectuals ‘on the left’ become aware of the 
imperial nature of the rising Stalinist regime very early on: 
The theories of the Muslim […] communists in the  9 0s were always tempered 
by hard realism. […]  bove all, they understood that the Great-Russian imperial 
tradition was ongoing: that once a territory fell under Russian control it 
remained for all times a part of the imperium. […] Theory and practice served the 
same purpose – to neutralize Great-Russian imperialism at its source, or, if that 
failed, to defeat it by forming new alliances and new coalitions.45  
Sultan-Galiev’s work in these troubled times followed two major directions  a turn 
inwards, toward rethinking Muslim subjectivity and praxis, and a dedication to the 
sophisticated, if dangerous, jadīdist art of concealment (satr).   
Double entendre with a tragic ending 
Indicative of his intricate role in mediating between the Soviet and the Muslim spaces in 
his immediate political milieu are Sultan-Galiev’s  9   articles in Zhizn’ natsional’nostei 
on the supposed ‘Methods of  ntireligious Propaganda amongst the Muslims’.46 
Although he is quick to concede to some utility of such propaganda and, indeed, to 
declare himself atheist, Sultan-Galiev goes to great pains in these articles to explain to 
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his Bolshevik readership that Islam is the youngest and by far the most vigorous of all 
the great world religions, and one harbouring distinct socialist values at that. ‘Sharī‘a, or 
Islamic law’, he informs the reader,  
governs all aspects of Muslim life on earth […].  nd, of course, among these laws, 
there are many that are, in essence, positive. Suffice it here to list: compulsory 
education […]; compulsory industriousness and work […]; the parental duty to 
educate their children until they have reached adulthood; acceptability of civil 
marriage; denial of private ownership of land, water and forests; repudiation of 
superstition; prohibition of witchcraft, gambling, luxury, extravagance, gold- and 
silver-wearing, drinking, bribery and cannibalism […]; [and] the establishment of 
an elaborate progressive tax system […]. Even family and inheritance laws of 
Islam [were progressive for their time]. For example, the researchers interpreted 
Muḥammad’s ḥadīth on polygamy as effectively delimiting the then widespread 
polygamous practice.47  
Sultan-Galiev goes on to praise the Muslim ‘clergy’, exemplified in the positionalities of 
the Tatar mullā and the Uzbek ‘ālim, who, unlike the Russian Orthodox clergy, 
generously perform numerous useful positions in the Muslim society, including that of 
‘priest’, teacher, administrator, judge and even doctor, if need be.48 The Muslim ‘clergy’, 
concludes Sultan-Galiev, consider themselves ‘servants’ of the people and listen to their 
constituents’ voice, and are, therefore, by far more democratic and enjoy much greater 
respect and influence than their Russian Orthodox ‘counterparts’.49    
The researchers who denounce Sultan-Galiev on the basis of these articles as a 
militant atheist and therefore firmly on the outside of the Muslim tradition fail, in my 
view, to understand the true nature of such an intervention in times of most ardent anti-
religious sentiments actively encouraged by the Soviet state. Far from being yet another 
piece of anti-religious propaganda, the primary concern of Sultan-Galiev’s articles was 
with painting an overwhelmingly positive picture of Islam and Muslim communities 
that could, and indeed did, justify their still relatively protected position in an 
increasingly violent anti-religious state. Declarative atheism with which the author 
assures his readers of his Bolshevik credentials was likely just that—a faithless 
expression of faithlessness to secure the necessary, even life-saving, authority of his 
account.50 
To understand this peculiar double entendre one needs to comprehend the value 
of satr (concealment) in the jadīdist tradition.51  The famous Bashkir historian, 
Turkologist and, in a later stage, leader of the anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet 
revolutionary Basmachi Movement (1916-1934), Ahmet-Zeki Validov (in Bashkir: 
Äxmätzäki Wälidov; in Turkish: Zeki Velidi Togan; 1890-1970), with whom Sultan-
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Galiev confessed to have maintained ‘a complicated relationship’,52 once intimated to 
one Ebubekir the following opinion of Ismail Gasprinski   
İsmail Bey Gasp ral  had been too servile! […] It was dangerous for us to 
encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a ‘big brother’ […] [and] 
make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial 
peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did.53 
Ebubekir replied  ‘The ideas of those times were different; moreover, had İsmail Bey 
said that, his [publications] would never have passed the censorship. In bad times he 
brought us at least some comfort!’54 Gasprinski  ’s talent to evade censors even at the 
cost of some unseemly alliances has been described by one commentator as ‘political 
quietism’.55 That could be, indeed, another name for political satr, which the jadīds 
employed with great skill and success,56 although at times to dismay of their more 
openly confrontational comrades.  
Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev’s satr was of an even more sophisticated type. There 
could be no doubt that he was aware at all times how dangerous a game this was, 
especially since 1923, the year in which he was arrested for the first time for 
conspiring—allegedly—to create ‘an [anti-Soviet] organisation of the Validov type’ and 
subsequently expelled from the party.57 Sultan-Galiev’s arrest was ordered after the 
infamous Soviet secret service, GPU (Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie; State 
Political Administration), had intercepted his coded letter enjoining an Iranian 
communist, Tajī  akhshī, ‘to get in touch with  fghani, Indian,  rab and Turkish 
revolutionaries’, supposedly for the purposes of creating the Colonial International.58 
The letter warned its reader  ‘Only in the unity of revolutionary Eastern countries lies 
the guarantee of success in the struggle for liberation. And only in that. Never forget 
this.’59 
It is nothing short of a miracle that Sultan-Galiev survived this episode and even 
managed to secure his release and regain, at least partly, Stalin’s trust. Yet it is precisely 
his extraordinary talent in keeping up certain outward appearances while concealing 
from the Soviet regime his less palatable plans and activities that made the final phase 
of his gradual departure from the Bolshevik ideology almost within reach. If it were not 
for an additional set of letters intercepted by the ever-watchful GPU, some of which 
making clear requests to ‘make a connection with Zeki Validov’,60 leader of the 
Basmachi Revolt, Sultan-Galiev may have even succeeded in creating a Muslim Third 
World insurrectionary socialist movement within and beyond the Soviet state. Instead, 
following a series of further arrests, his death by firing squad was finally authorised by 
the Stalinist regime and carried out in January 1940. His elimination was accompanied 
with what was by then the typical Stalinist chistka (purge), in which numerous 
 [Hamzić, ‘Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev and the Idea of Muslim Marxism’; Page 11/17] 
members of the Sultan-Galiev family as well as Tatar Muslim intelligentsia found guilty 
of sultangalievshchina (Sultan-Galievism) were sent to death.  
Epilogue 
Thus ended Sultan-Galiev’s experiment with Muslim Marxism, or at least this is how its 
interbellum phase was finished off. Its legacies, however, have extended far and wide, 
especially in the times of decolonisation of the 1960s and, even before that, through the 
revolutionary work of many a non-Soviet student of the Communist University of the 
Toilers of the East (or KUTV, Kommunisticheski  universitet trudyashchikhsya  ostoka), 
at which the likes of Tan Malaka, Hồ Chí Minh, Liu Shaoqi, Magomet Mamakaev, Khalid 
 akdash, Manabendra Nath Roy and Naz m Hikmet attended Sultan-Galiev’s lectures on 
the ‘Colonial East and World Revolution’ course.61 His work has also been reclaimed by 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Ben Bella and other political leaders experimenting with 
various forms of Arab socialism. Both Nasser and Ben Bella are said to have kept Sultan-
Galiev’s portraits in their offices,62 but the influence of his ideas may not have extended 
much beyond this symbolic gesture, nowadays easily comparable with the penchant for 
Che Guevara’s portraits, to whom, incidentally, Sultan-Galiev bore a striking physical 
resemblance.  
The peculiarity of Muslim Marxism as espoused by Sultan-Galiev was not only in 
its methodological idiosyncrasy, whereby the principles such as that of satr had been 
skilfully employed, in times of trouble, to assist the revolutionary cause. It was also in 
its early and in many ways avant-garde awareness of religious, cultural and racial 
connotations of class struggle in colonial and post-colonial contexts. In his unfinished 
 9 4 work titled ‘Theses on the  asis of Socio-Political, Economic and Cultural 
Development of the Turkic Peoples of  sia and Europe’,63 Sultan-Galiev wrote of the 
need to reclaim historical materialism as an Eastern intellectual tradition, in a move 
resembling contemporary calls to end the hegemony of global Northern epistemologies 
in academia and beyond.64 Muslim insurrectionary subjectivity, upon which Sultan-
Galiev had placed all his hopes and dreams of global socialist freedom, had always been 
for him an intrinsically complex and multifaceted phenomenon, embodying at once a 
wide range of ethnic, national and religious practices of belonging, which in turn was 
conducive of specifically socialist, and indeed revolutionary, Muslim praxis.  
Yet, if one is to recast Muslim Marxism of Sultan-Galiev’s strand as an expression 
of radical reform within the Muslim tradition, one ultimately needs to resolve the 
question of declarative atheism that some have understood to constitute a rapid and 
irreversible exit from Muslim hieropraxis, tout court. Given the specific context in which 
it was made, I am reluctant to ascribe to Sultan-Galiev’s one-time declaration any 
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significance other than that of a strategic move, taking the practice of satr to an extreme 
level. That all of Marxism does not have to be atheist or agnostic has since been proven 
particularly in the various Muslim contexts, as it is, indeed, obvious that being Muslim 
entails an infinitely complex web of practices of belonging. For all these reasons, Mir-
Said Sultan-Galiev’s idea of Muslim Marxism has much to offer to contemporary 
attempts at reformulation and re-imagination of Muslim post-imperial, religious, 
political and social selfhood. 
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